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Abstract—In this paper, we study stealthy false-data at-
tacks that exploit the vulnerabilities of power budgeting scheme
in NoC, which can cause catastrophic denial of service (DoS) ef-
fects. Essentially, when a power budget request packet is routed
through a Trojan-infected network-on-chip node’s router, the
power budget request can be unknowingly modiﬁed. The global
manager then tends to make really bad power budget allocation
decisions with all the tampered power requests it received. That
is, legitimate applications will be victimized with lower power
budgets than what they initially asked for, and thus, could
suffer serious performance degradation; malicious applications,
on the other hand, may be entitled to high power budgets
and thus see performance boost that they do not deserve.
Our study has shown that this new type of DoS attack can
be initiated and sustained by a simple hardware Trojan (HT)
circuit that is extremely hard to be detected. The effects of this
new DoS attack are simulated using a network model, and all
the major parameters and factors that impact the attack effects
are identiﬁed and quantiﬁed.
Index Terms—power budgeting, Hardware Trojan
I. INTRODUCTION
Security of servers, data centers, mobile computing and
Internet of Things is largely dependent on the security of the
many-core chips that these facilities/systems have adopted.
Unfortunately, many-core chips are susceptible to be attacked
by hardware Trojans (HT) which can be easily implanted to
the chips at any stage from design to manufacturing, as chip
designing and manufacturing is going global, and licensing
of third party IP cores is becoming a commonplace in many-
core chip designs. In contrast to a modern many-core chip
with billions of transistors and complex functionalities, an HT
circuit has an extremely low transistor count, making it hardly
visible, and thus difﬁcult to be detected by most known
ofﬂine HT detection methods [1], [2]. If many-core devices
infected with HTs ﬁnally get deployed, they can create
catastrophic effects, including dangerous security breach and
severe performance degradation [3], [4]. HTs have been
designed to explore many different types of vulnerabilities
of a many-core chip that may have, and in this paper, we
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show one such vulnerability that roots in the power budgeting
scheme adopted in the chip.
Power budgeting is necessary in many-core chips [5],
as the total power budget typically is not sufﬁcient to meet
the power needs for all the cores to run at their peak
performance simultaneously. Given the fact that the power
available to the cores is limited, the core designated as the
global manager allocates power among all the cores [6], [7].
To make a fair and optimized power budgeting decision, the
global manager needs to solicit budget requests from all the
threads/applications running at different cores. Each power
budget request is packetized and routed to the global manager
through the chip’s networked communication infrastructure,
known as the network-on-chip (NoC).
Provided the hacker’s agents can gain access to the
global manager through a simple hardware Trojan embedded
in an NoC router, the power budgeting system can be then
attacked where power requests initiated by various cores are
deliberately modiﬁed for harm. That is, power requests from
the malicious applications (legitimate applications) will be
increased (or decreased) to be higher (or lower) value than
what were actually requested. Upon receiving the manipu-
lated power budget requests, the global manager, irrespective
of the power budgeting algorithms [8], [9] it runs, always
allocates power budgets to favor the malicious applications,
but penalize the legitimate applications. As a result of such a
stealth (a.k.a. false-data) attack against the power-budgeting
scheme, a new many-core chip may experience signiﬁcant
performance degradation and even complete malfunctioning.
In this paper, we present a DoS attack caused by HT
and its circuit design that can launch and sustain aforemen-
tioned stealth attack against the power-budgeting scheme. As
effectiveness of HT-enabled DoS attacks can be attributed to
multiple factors, an attack model is built in this paper to
quantify their impacts.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the background information and surveys relevant
previous studies. Section III provides a design of hardware
Trojan that enables a DoS attack that hackers tamper and
steal power budgets from other threads. Section IV deﬁnes
the related system parameters of the attack model, and
section V reports the simulation results under different attack
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scenarios using the proposed attack model. Finally, Section
VI concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND AND PREVIOUS STUDIES
In this section, we will ﬁrst review the power budgeting
schemes that have been applied to many core systems. We
then categorize various hardware Trojan enabled DoS attacks
seen in many-core systems.
A. Power Budgeting in Many-Core Systems
We assume a many-core system of interest follows a
tiled architecture where each tile consists of a core, an L1
cache, an L2 cache bank, and a router [10]. Each core
can operate at any of the preset frequencies, and a higher
frequency leads to higher performance at a cost of higher
power consumption. As the total power budget is limited,
power budgeting aims to optimize the overall performance
by choosing an appropriate frequency for each core. The
decisions on frequency selection, or equivalently power allo-
cation, are made by a special core designated as the global
manager [6], [11]. To make an optimized power budgeting
decision, the global manager needs to solicit budget requests
from all the threads/applications running at different cores.
Power allocation problem can be solved following many
different strategies, such as heuristics [8], control theory [12]
or dynamic programming [9].
B. DoS Attack
DoS attack enabled by hardware Trojan (HT) is be-
coming a serious threat to modern many-core chips [3],
[13]. Various circuit level HT detection techniques have been
proposed, based on logic testing and side channel analysis
during the post-silicon test/validation process [1], [14]. Most
HTs have tiny area compared to the whole chip, the HTs
detection methods cannot detect all the HTs.
DoS attacks on a many-core chip can target different
components of the chip, including the memory system [15],
and the network-on-chip (NoC) [16], [17]. With the help
of hardware Trojans (HTs) [3], [4], [13], DoS attacks can
be classiﬁed as 1) ﬂooding attack [18], [19], where a large
volume of useless packets ﬂoods a victim node and saturates
it; 2) packet drop attack, where some packets are dropped or
directed to some malicious nodes so that the victim node
can never receive a single packet designated to it [20];
3) privilege escalation attack [21], where an average user
process is granted the privileges of a supervisor so that it
can steal passwords; and 4) routing loop attack [2], where
packets that pass the malicious node will be routed back to
the source node, effectively blocking the source core from
communicating with any other cores.
III. HT-ENABLED DOS ATTACKS TARGETING THE
POWER BUDGETING SYSTEM
In this section, we show that proposed DoS attack can be
launched targeting the power budgeting scheme of a many-
core chip by implanting HTs in NoC’s routers. And a detailed
design of such hardware Trojan is shown.
A. Packet Frames
Generally speaking, a data packet arriving at a network
node or a router has 4 ﬁelds: the source address (16 bits in
this study), the destination address (16 bits), packet type (32
bits) and payload ﬁeld (32 bits). Additional information, if
needed, can be included into an optional ﬁeld that is named
so.
As shown in Fig. 1(a), a packet will be recognized as a
power request packet if its packet type ﬁeld is POWER REQ.
In this case, the payload of the packet is the power request
value.
A packet will be recognized as a Trojan conﬁguration
packet if its packet type is CONFIG CMD as shown in
Fig. 1(b). For a conﬁguration packet, its source address is
actually the attacker’s ID and the packet type ﬁeld includes
the CONFIG CMD, global manager and activation signal. A
conﬁguration packet is meant to be sent to an implanted HT
core by attacker to set up the HT for attack.
0 8 16 3124
Source address Destination address
POWER_REQ
Payload (Power request value)
OPTIONS (OPTIONAL)
(a)
(b)
0 8 16 3124
Attacker ID Destination address
CONFIG_CMD
#EMPTY#
OPTIONS (OPTIONAL)
Global manager Activation signal
Fig. 1: (a) Normal power request packet. (b) Attackers
conﬁguration packet.
B. HT Attack Process
When a hacker is about to attack, it broadcasts the
conﬁguration packet that includes the global manager’s ID,
its own core ID and the activation signal. When the conﬁg-
uration packet arrives at the infected nodes, the HT stores
the global manager’s ID and the attacker’s ID in its local
registers, if it has not done so. The HT’s activation state
is set by the activation signal in the conﬁguration packet.
The hacker can launch different attack modes by setting the
right activation signal, and the conﬁguration packets may be
sent out periodically for the control of attack strategies. For
example, if the attacker agents want the HTs to be active in
a speciﬁc cycle time, a series of conﬁguration packets can
be sent with activation signals alternated to be ON and OFF.
After conﬁguration, when a victim’s data packet passes
through those routers with implanted HT, if the HT is
not activated, the packet is forwarded normally (i.e., no
modiﬁcation to the packet will ever be made). Otherwise,
the HT checks whether the data packet’s destination is the
global manager and the source is not hacker’s agent. If so, the
triggering module triggers the functional module to modify
the value of the power request ﬁeld.
C. HT Circuits Implementation
To launch the proposed HT-enabled attack, an HT circuit
includes some registers to store the conﬁguration parameters
2
from the hackers’ agents. The triggering module scans data
packets, and if a packet is found to match the conﬁguration
parameters stored in the HT’s local register, the functional
module is then enabled if HT is activated. The functional
module basically manipulates the payload of the packet that
the power request is changed to a smaller value. As Fig.
2 shows, an HT has 3 comparators and 2 registers that sit
between the router’s input buffer and the routing computation
module.
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(a) Internal design of an HT.
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(b) The location of the HT inside a router.
Fig. 2: Hardware Trojan Design
D. HT’s Area and Power
Each HT has an area of 12.1716μm2 and consumes
0.55018μW power, as reported by Synopsys Design Com-
piler under 45nm TSMC library. As a comparison, a router
with 4 virtual channels and 5-ﬂit depth First-Input-First-
Output has a total area of 71814 μm2 and consumes a total
power of 31881μW , obtained from DSENT. In a simple term,
an HTs area and power is about 0.017% and 0.0017% of a
single router, making such an HT hard to be detected. For
a whole chip, such as section V-C shows, 60 HTs almost
infect all packets in a 512-node chip, the HTs’ area is about
730.296 μm2 and consume 33.0108μW power. 60 HTs’s area
and power is about 0.002% and 0.0002% of all routers in a
512-node chip.
IV. EVALUATING THE DOS ATTACK EFFECT
Aforementioned DoS attack tends to cause victim appli-
cations/threads to suffer from serious performance degrada-
tion while attacker’s malicious application may see consid-
erable performance gain. The effectiveness of the proposed
DoS attack can be attributed to a number of factors listed
below:
• Number of hardware Trojans in the NoC.
• Locations of the hardware Trojans and the global man-
ager. When an HT is close to the global manager, since
more budget request packets are likely to pass the HT
before reaching the global manager, this HT can make
more packet modiﬁcations, and thus can have higher
impacts on the attack effect.
• Application’s sensitivity to its power budget. Perfor-
mance impacts due to power budget changes can be
application-speciﬁc. For example, performance of an
instruction-bounded application is typically hit harder
than that of memory-bounded applications.
A. Measures of Attack Effect
Deﬁnition 1 Application k’s performance θk is deﬁned by
θk =
∑
j∈Ck
IPC(j, k, fj) · fj (1)
where θk is application k’s instruction per clock (IPC) value,
Ck is the set of cores running application k’s threads, and
IPC(j, k, fj) is core j’s IPC.
Deﬁnition 2 Application k’s performance change Θk is de-
ﬁned as
Θk =
θk
Λk
(2)
where θk is the application k’s IPC value with HTs and Λk
is the application k’s IPC without HTs.
Deﬁnition 3 The attack effect of the proposed DoS attack
Q(Δ,Γ) is deﬁned as
Q(Δ,Γ) =
V ·∑a∈ΔΘa
A ·∑v∈ΓΘv
(3)
where V and A are the numbers of victims and attackers
respectively. Δ and Γ are the sets of attacker applications
and victim applications respectively.
If attacker’s performance improves, or victim’s perfor-
mance degrades, the value of Q(Δ,Γ) would increase as
well. In a simple word, the larger value Q(Δ,Γ) has, the
stronger an attack is.
B. Factors Impacting Attack Effect
There are a number of factors that can impact the attack
effects.
1) Application’s sensitivity to power budget: Applications
have different performance changes when their V/F
values vary.
Deﬁnition 4 Core j’s sensitivity to power budget while
running application z, denoted as φ(j, z) is deﬁned by
φ(j, z) =
s−1∑
i=1
∣∣∣
IPC(j, z, τi)− IPC(j, z, τi+1)
τi − τi+1
∣∣∣ (4)
τ1 < τ2 < · · · < τs
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where τi and τi+1 are the available frequency levels,
IPC(j, z, τi) is core j’s IPC when it is running appli-
cation z’s thread with a frequency level of τi.
Deﬁnition 5 Application k’s sensitivity to power budget
is deﬁned by
Φk =
∑
i∈Ck φ(i, k)
|Ck| (5)
where Ck is the set of cores running application k’s
threads.
2) Parameters characterizing system architecture: The dis-
tribution of HTs has performance implications on both
attackers and victims.
Deﬁnition 6 Assume there are a total of m malicious
nodes. The coordinates of the m HTs’ virtual center is
deﬁned by
ωX =
∑m
i=1XMi
m
,ωY =
∑m
i=1 YMi
m
(6)
where XMi and YMi are x and y coordinates of the
malicious nodes’ respectively.
Deﬁnition 7 Distance between the global manager and
the virtual center of those HTs denoted as ρ is deﬁned
by
ρ =MD(O,Ω) (7)
where O is the global manager’s location, and Ω is the
HTs’ virtual center.
If the virtual center of HTs is far away from the
global manager, measured as long distance between the
two, fewer packets with power requests actually pass
through the nodes infected with HTs. In other words,
performance of the system has a lower probability to be
affected.
Deﬁnition 8 HTs’ density denoted as η is the average
Manhattan distance between HTs’ virtual center and
each malicious nodes. It measures the variance of the
HT distribution, which is deﬁned as
η =
∑m
i=1MD(Ω,Mi)
m
(8)
where m is the number of malicious nodes.
A higher density indicates a large number of malicious
nodes are around the virtual center, and more packets
may be intercepted and modiﬁed, leading to a higher
infection rate.
C. Modeling Attack Effects
Attack effect can be quantiﬁed using a linear model as
follows.
Q(Δ,Γ) ≈ a1 × ρ+ a2 × η + a3 ×m
+
V∑
j=1
bj × Φγj +
A∑
k=1
ck × Φδk + a0 (9)
where ai, i = 0, 1, 2, 3, bj , ck, 1  j  V, 1  k  A
are the regression coefﬁcients, γj and δk are jth and kth
victim/attacker application, ρ is the HT’s distance between
HTs’ virtual center and the global manager, η is the HT’s
distribution density, m is the number of malicious nodes,
Φγj and Φδk are the victim and the attacker applications’
sensitivities to power budget, respectively.
Following the attack effect model, we formulate a prob-
lem to maximize the attack effect by selecting the proper
distance and density of HTs. The constraints are the area of
the HT circuits, or equivalently, the number of HTs that will
be selected by the attacker. This attack effect optimization
problem can be formulated as follows.
max
ρ,η,m
Q(Δ,Γ) (10)
subject to m MHT (11)
where MHT is the maximum number of malicious nodes
selected by the hackers.
To solve the problem, one can exhaustively enumerate
all possible values for above mentioned three metrics: 1)
number of HTs, 2) distance between the global manager and
the virtual center of HTs, 3) HTs distribution density.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Experimental Setup
Experiments are performed to evaluate the attack ef-
fect with the number of HTs and HTs’ distribution. The
experiments are using an event-driven many-core simulator
in C++ [22]. The simulated architecture is a shared memory
structure, with each core having its own L1 cache and a
shared L2 cache bank [10]. A tile is connected to a local
network interface and a router, and together they form one
node of the NoC. Table I lists the simulator conﬁguration.
Multi-threaded applications can have their threads running
on different cores. Communications between threads take
place through the NoC. The messages in the network are
generated by memory transactions including read/write ac-
cess requirements. Table II lists the benchmarks used for
performance evaluation, and they are selected from PARSEC
and SPLASH-2. In the following experiments, we select a 16
× 16 2D mesh with adaptive routing as the underline NoC
architecture.
B. Evaluating the Infection Rate
Fig. 3 (a) compares the infection rates when the global
manager is at different locations and the system size is 64.
One can see that along with the increase of the number
of HTs, the infection rate increases as well. If the global
manager is placed at the corner of the chip, the corresponding
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TABLE I: Conﬁguration used in the simulation
Number of processors 256 (Alpha ISA 64 compatible)
Fetch/Decode/Commit size 4/4/4
ROB size 64
L1 D cache(private) 16 KB, two-way, 32B line, two
cycles, two ports, dual tags
L1 I cache(private) 32 KB, two-way, 64B line, two
cycles
L2 cache(shared) MESI 64 KB slice/node, 64B line
protocol six cycles, two ports
Main memory size 2 GB, latency 200 cycles
On-chip network parameters
NoC ﬂit size 72-bit
Data packet size 5 ﬂits
Meta packet size 1 ﬂit
NoC latency router two cycles, link one cycle
NoC Virtual Channel (VC) number 4
NoC buffer 5× 5 ﬂits
Routing algorithm XY Routing
TABLE II: Benchmarks used in the simulation
PARSEC streamcluster, swaptions, ferret, uidanimate, blackscholes,
freqmine, dedup, canneal, vips
SPLASH-2 barnes, raytrace
infection rate is more than 20% higher than that of the case
where the global manager is placed at the center, assuming
there are more than 10 HTs. When the system size is 512, a
similar trend is observed as shown in Fig. 3 (b). The reason
is that a packet loaded with a power budget request has to
travel a long distance to reach the global manager that is at
the corner of the chip. Longer routing distance increases the
chance that such a packet is intercepted and modiﬁed by an
HT node.
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Fig. 3: Infection rate comparison with different HT numbers
when the system size is (a) 64, and (b) 512.
Fig. 4 compares the infection rates of 3 different cases:
(i) HTs are all placed close to the center of the chip, (ii)
HTs are randomly distributed, and (iii) HTs are placed to a
concentrated area near one corner. Here, the global manager
is assumed to be at the center of the chip.
From Fig. 4, one can see that the infection rates of the
cases that the HTs are near the center location of the chip are
higher than those of the other two cases. For example, in Fig.
4 (a), when the system size is 256, the infection rate of the
case that the HTs are close to the center is 1.59× and 9.85×
more than those of the other two cases, respectively. The
reason is that, in the case HTs are around the center, more
packets with power requests are likely to be intercepted and
modiﬁed. In the case when HTs are randomly distributed,
fewer packets with power requests will be attacked. In the
case when HTs are clustered around one corner of the chip,
some packets with power requests will never be attacked.
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Fig. 4: Infection rate comparison with different HT distribu-
tions, when the number of HTs is (a) 116 , (b)
1
8 of the system
size.
C. Evaluating Attack Effect
We use the mixes of a few benchmarks to test the attack
effects of the proposed DoS attack. The numbers of attackers
and victims are set to be 1, 2, and 3, and they can be mixed
to obtain four combinations, as tabulated in Table III.
TABLE III: Benchmark combinations used in the experi-
ments
Combination Attackers Victims
Mix-1 barnes, canneal blackscholes, raytrace
Mix-2 freqmine, swaptions raytrace, vips
Mix-3 canneal barnes, vips, dedup
Mix-4 barnes, streamcluster,
freqmine
raytrace
Fig. 5 shows each mix’s Q value with respect to infec-
tion rate. Each application is set to have 64 threads and run
on a chip with 256 cores. Overall speaking, a higher infection
rate leads to a larger Q value. In the case of Mix-4 which
has three attackers, the Q value reaches its peak (i.e., 6.89) at
the infection rate of 0.9. In Fig. 6 (a), one can see that when
the infection rate is 0.5, the performance of the attackers is
improved by as much as 1.2×, and the victim’s performance
drops by 0.6×. In Fig. 6 (c), when there are 3 victims, and
the infection rate is 0.5, the performance improvement of the
attacker is as much as 1.35×. In Fig. 6 (d), when there are 3
attackers, and the infection rate remains at 0.5, the victims’
performance degrades by as much as 0.8×.
Next, the attack effect of an NoC system with HTs
optimally placed (select number of HTs, distance between the
global manager and virtual center of HTs, HTs distribution
density which solve Eqns. 10) is compared with that of a
system with randomly placed HTs. In the case that there
are 16 HTs in the chip and the global manager is in the
center of the chip, the attack effect of the NoC with optimal
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HT distribution is about 30% higher than that of NoC but
with a random HT distribution for the mixes of 1, 2 and
3. More signiﬁcant improvement (by as much as 110%) in
attack effect is seen in the case of mix-4. In a simple word,
solving the attack effect maximization problem in Eqns. 10
can indeed improve the attack effects substantially.
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Fig. 5: Attack effect comparison with different infection rates.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a new HT-enabled DoS attack
that hackers can steal power budget from other applica-
tions/threads in many-core chips. Once the power request
packet from a victim application/thread traverses through
a malicious router infected with a special HT, the power
request is modiﬁed. As a result, the victim applications
suffer from poorer performance due to lower power budgets
that they were granted to operate on, while the malicious
applications/threads can be assigned with excessive power
budgets. The effects of the DoS attack include performance
degradation of the victims and performance boost of the
malicious applications/threads, both of which were found
to be related to various system parameters in this paper.
This new DoS attack can cause catastrophic consequences,
and more research on detection and protection against such
attacks is needed.
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